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Management Control Systems 
for International Operations 
Dr. John C. H. Woo 
Associate Professor of Accounting 
California State College at Fullerton 
During a sabbatical leave Dr. Woo visited 
fifteen large U.S. companies and their overseas 
units as well as ten European and Japanese 
companies in order to conduct an empirical 
study of management control systems for inter-
national operations. The Touche Ross Interna-
tional Executive Office aided Dr. Woo by sup-
plying introductions to our overseas offices and 
to certain clients. His study is the result of his 
on-the-spot inquiry and interviews with key 
executives and managers and his analysis of 
the primary sources of materials provided. 
I. Strategic Planning 
Defining a Company's International 
Objectives and Organizational Structure 
In this area, I found an encouraging trend in that an 
increasing number of the companies covered in this 
study have formalized, after carefully considering in-
vestment opportunities on a world-wide basis, a clearly 
defined and well integrated set of international objec-
tives. Some companies have broad policies for the 
acquisition and use of the resources to attain these ob-
jectives. However, I found that almost an equal number 
of the companies visited have failed to systematically 
establish their objectives on a global basis, and still 
cling to vague, fragmentary, isolated, and even outdated 
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ones. The latter condition has not provided, in my opin-
ion, an adequate basis for setting up proper international 
organization and management control systems. This in-
adequacy is probably caused by the failure of top man-
agement to understand the importance of a formalized 
and well integrated set of global objectives. 
Despite the increasing importance of their global 
business in recent years, a majority of the companies 
covered in this study have kept an international division 
which employs a separate corporate staff. In some com-
panies, this division retains highly centralized authority; 
being independent of the domestic side, and reporting 
directly to the top management. In other cases it has lost 
its autonomous position and highly centralized authority. 
Its previous authority in broad policy matters has been 
taken over by a separate group in company headquar-
ters charged with worldwide staff responsibility in plan-
ning and development. In either case, these companies 
have not developed a truly "multinational" organiza-
tional structure; that is, either a structure organized 
along multiple product lines headed by executives with 
worldwide product responsibilities, or a structure or-
ganized on a geographic basis and headed by execu-
tives with regional or country responsibilities. 
A smaller number of the companies covered in this 
study have seen fit to replace the international division 
with several regional organizations which report directly 
to the top management. While affiliated companies in 
various countries are responsible for day-to-day opera-
tions, the regional organizations can coordinate and 
control more effectively and efficiently because their 
geographic proximity permits them to adjust to changing 
local conditions more rapidly. 
Apparently no single form of international organiza-
tion can meet the varying objectives and specific needs 
of all companies. It seems that large companies heavily 
involved in global business can best organize their inter-
national structure in one of the two basic forms. When a 
company's product lines are quite different from one 
another, each requiring a highly distinctive process of 
research, development and production, and each of 
them has already reached an economy of scale on the 
global basis, it is desirable to structure the company's 
international organization on product lines. Each prod-
uct line executive at corporate headquarters is vested 
with worldwide authority and responsibility in his line 
of specialty. Common matters affecting various coun-
tries or regions are coordinated at the corporate or re-
gional level (if regional organizations are established). 
On the other hand, if a company's products can be sub-
stantially combined on a country level, and if cross-
fertilization of technology is not handicapped by geo-
graphic separation, it is logical to organize operating 
units on a country-to-country basis. The country units 
report directly to a top executive at the corporate head-
quarters or to a regional organization which, in turn, 
reports directly to the top management. Common mat-
ters affecting various products are coordinated at the 
corporate or regional level. In either case, there appears 
little or no need for retaining a separate international 
division at corporate headquarters. Any staff functions 
of planning and development at the corporate level can 
be performed by a single group having world-wide re-
sponsibilities. 
II. Management Information Systems 
There has been much discussion of integrated man-
agement information systems designed to serve all 
levels of management in different parts of the world. 
They would be built upon on-line worldwide communi-
cations networks with a series of computers at corporate 
headquarters and key spots around the world. One can 
point out many potential uses of such networks in en-
gineering, production, marketing and financial areas. 
However, even for many giant-size companies, I have 
observed that fulfilling presently identified needs would 
not be justified by the extremely high costs of designing, 
installing and maintaining such systems. It appears, 
therefore, that the immediate issue in management in-
formation systems is not so much a real, current need 
for an advanced worldwide networks system as for the 
improvement of existing systems. 
I have noted a general failure to substantially identify, 
under the constraints of a company's objectives and 
organizational structure, the real needs of management, 
and to determine the relevancy and importance of infor-
mation output. This results in a flood of paperwork con-
taining irrelevant and useless data. Changes in key 
variables for the critical success factors of a company's 
business, the most vital information needed by man-
agement, are often neither clearly identified nor singled 
out for management attention. Also, not enough efforts 
have been made to systematically collect, process, and 
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evaluate rapidly changing environmental forces in dif-
ferent countries of the world. For better utilization of 
human and economic resources, management informa-
tion output must be selective—an important principle 
seemingly not followed by many of the companies I 
visited. 
Another disturbing observation is that some manage-
ment information systems appear far from coherent, 
consistent, or integrated, resulting in information out-
put which is duplicate in coverage and even conflicting 
in content. It is conducive to different interpretations 
by different users, causing a breakdown of management 
communications. 
III. Long-range Profit Planning 
and Capital Budgeting 
A number of companies covered in this study have 
found it worthwhile to devote considerable effort to 
undertaking a formalized approach to long-range plan-
ning. Detailed procedures vary; but operating units in 
various countries normally submit, in accordance with 
corporate guidelines and instructions, their individual 
four- or five-year profit plans, which are then reviewed, 
coordinated and consolidated by the corporate office. 
The final plan for the entire company tends to be quite 
comprehensive, and the procedures for monitoring its 
progress are systematic and elaborate. Coordination is 
also effected between long-range plans and short-term 
budgets. 
However, there seems to exist a common lack of com-
petent economists, statisticians, and operation research-
ers in the corporate office who would be able to use 
advance knowledge and methods to explore and evalu-
ate investment opportunities around the globe, and to 
forecast sales on a long-term basis. A few exceptions to 
this are noted. One company employs a group of experts 
of high caliber who attempt to quantify risk factors of 
long-term investments in some politically unstable and 
economically less developed countries. The task is ex-
tremely difficult since advanced methods have yet to be 
refined and established. Nevertheless, the efforts in 
finding a new path should pay ample dividends in the 
long run. 
It is disappointing to find that a considerable number 
of managers still fail to recognize the time value of 
money and thus refuse to use the present-value method 
for evaluation of long-term capital expenditures. This 
theoretically superior method is rejected on the grounds 
that it is more difficult than the simple payback or tradi-
tional rate-of-return method, and that top management 
does not understand the use of a discount rate to com-
pute the present value of future cash inflows. I believe 
that such persistent refusal is due either to lack of under-
standing of the supremacy of this method or to the 
erroneous impression that it entails complicated cal-
culations. 
Some companies use computers to facilitate screen-
ing, rationing and approving of capital projects. After 
they are put into operation, comparisons between actual 
results and projected figures of revenues and expenses 
are not made by computer print-outs. The process of 
follow-up has much value in checking the reliability of 
original estimates and thus correcting any shortcomings 
in projection techniques. When asked why such follow-
up was not being made, one manager admitted that he 
could not give a satisfactory explanation. 
IV. Short-term Profit Planning 
and Control Budgeting 
Almost without exception all companies devote con-
siderable time to setting up and enforcing an elaborate 
system of budgeting to plan and control short-term 
profits. The purpose is to maximize short-term profits— 
a target generally overemphasized, sometimes even at 
the expense of long-term objectives. U.S.-based com-
panies, more so than their European- and Japanese-
based counterparts, demand and scrutinize closely the 
results of operations month by month, and control major 
variances in actual results from budgeted targets. 
Although line managers of operating units in various 
countries participate, to a greater or lesser degree, in 
the formulation of annual budgets, I cannot avoid the 
impression that many still view a budget as a negative 
device of restraint and pressure. Much has yet to be 
done to make budgets a truly motivating instrument. 
First of all, the budgeted goals, whether prescribed by 
corporate headquarters or initiated by operating units, 
must be reasonably attainable. Next, line managers on 
down to personnel at the operating level must have 
genuine participation in the preparation of budgets. 
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Budget modifications at the higher levels must be thor-
oughly discussed and agreed upon by all parties con-
cerned. These requirements are particularly important 
in international areas where personnel of different cul-
tural and social backgrounds generally have difficulty 
in understanding, without effective communications and 
actual participation in the budget process, the useful 
purpose of budgeting. 
One company covered in this study employs a 100-
point system as an incentive compensation plan for its 
international managers. Most of the 100 points are 
awarded on the basis of actual performance as com-
pared with budgeted measurements of profits. Only a 
small percentage of the points are based on a subjective 
evaluation of personnel and general administration 
areas. The formulas for calculating the points are de-
tailed in the incentive compensation plan which is cir-
culated in advance to the managers being rated. This 
plan of monetary recognition for good performance, 
coupled with the budgets, has apparently worked well 
for this company as an effective means of motivation. 
V. Profit Responsibility Centers: 
Measurement and Evaluation 
of Segment Performance 
I was pleased to observe that the majority of the com-
panies visited have established, within legal and other 
constraints, some form of profit responsibility centers 
around the world. To conform to the concept of respon-
sibility accounting, the head of an international profit 
center must clearly be given commensurate authority 
and responsibility in planning, control and decision-
making, and a great deal of flexibility in day-to-day oper-
ations. He must be motivated, while working under dif-
ferent cultural and other conditions, not only to maximize 
the best interests of his own center, but also to minimize, 
in a realistic sense, any conflict between the objectives 
of the center and those of the company as a whole. His 
performance must be measured and evaluated in terms 
of the items (such as revenues, expenses) over which he 
has substantial control. 
Unfortunately, as far as can be detected, the reported 
profits of many responsibility centers in various coun-
tries are distorted, to varying degrees, by some allocated 
costs and transfer prices. 
It is my opinion that corporate headquarters' and other 
indirectly associated costs should be treated as respec-
tive cost items which need not be allocated to interna-
tional profit centers. If they must be allocated in 
accordance with the corporate policy, they should be 
shown on the income statement below the line as non-
controllable items for which a profit-center manager 
is not responsible. 
Transfer prices, to be equitable to both supplying 
and buying units, should be based upon market prices. 
If deviations from market prices are justified for tax, 
foreign exchange, or other reasons, market prices 
should still be used above the line on the income state-
ment, with the differences shown below the line as non-
controllable items. If market prices are not available, 
an alternative is for the profit centers to negotiate and 
agree upon acceptable prices. 
International profit centers have responsibility for the 
satisfactory rate of return on their investments. This 
proves useful as an overall measurement as well as an 
indication of trends. For a more precise measurement 
of profitability, the concept of "residual income" can 
be used. Simply stated, this calls for a capital charge, 
usually based upon the cost of capital of the entire com-
pany, for the investment in an international profit center. 
The net income, after deduction of this capital charge, 
is treated as residual income and shown in appropriate 
monetary units. This method would avoid the possibility 
that a profit center might turn down an investment 
project yielding a smaller rate of return than its historical 
one, although still higher than the corporate overall rate 
of return. The capital charge is normally on par with or 
below the corporate rate of return. 
A large Dutch-based multinational company employs 
replacement value of long-term assets and inventories 
for rate of return measurement. I was satisfied, after 
observing its actual methods and procedures, that the 
figures used for replacement value are generally reliable, 
although some minor trade-off of objectivity for rele-
vance cannot be avoided. I concur with its management 
that this rate of return, based upon replacement value 
instead of historical costs during these more than two 
decades of continuous inflation, is a much more relevant 
and meaningful measurement. After talking to a number 
of managers in U.S.-based companies, I have concluded 
that their chances of using current or replacement value 
in computing rate of return are rather remote. The fact 
that current or replacement value is not acceptable for 
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external financial reporting in the U.S. strengthens the 
inertia of not innovating it for internal management use, 
despite the continuous necessity of estimating the cur-
rent or replacement value of long-term assets and in-
ventories for fire insurance purposes. 
In conformity with the responsibility accounting con-
cept discussed above, the income statement of an 
international profit center should be divided into two 
sections: the first section consisting of those revenues 
and expenses for which the manager has substantial 
control and, therefore, responsibility; the second section 
comprising those items for which he has no substantial 
control and, therefore, no responsibility. The latter items 
include allocated expenses from corporate headquarters 
and adjustments of transfer prices as mentioned earlier. 
If measurable profitability is used, and rightly so, as one 
major criterion for promotion bonus, and other incen-
tives, it should be based upon the net income shown in 
the first section. The final income arrived at in the sec-
ond section can be used to evaluate profitability of the 
unit, but not the performance of its manager. 
When I discussed this new approach with some man-
agers of international profit centers, the response was 
positive and enthusiastic. Currently, however, there are 
no signs that it will be accepted by corporate manage-
ment. The net income being used today is generally the 
same for both the measurement of profitability of an 
international profit center and the evaluation of per-
formance of its manager. This is detrimental to the 
motivation of international managers; it can even lead 
to incorrect managerial decisions. 
